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Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the main tenets of industrial policy. Industrial 
policy, as a conscious effort on the part of government to encourage and promote 
activities specific, industry or sector with an array of policies, through the process 
of cooperation and coordination with the private sector, is an indispensable tool 
for steering economic development. It is needed both for developing and developed 
countries. Due to the information and coordination externalities, the productive 
forces cannot be developed through the market mechanism itself and the 
intervention on the part of government is needed. The programmes of an industrial 
policy need to be tailor made and country specific. However, some of the 
programmes have been historically shown as effective. Those programmes are: 
Subsidizing costs of “self-discovery”, Developing mechanisms for higher risk 
finance, Internalizing coordination externalities, Public R&D, Subsidizing general 
technical training, Taking advantage of nationals abroad (Rodrik 2004). Serbia as 
a country that has experienced the process of deindustrialisation needs an 
industrial policy that will take into account the main tenets of the concept of 
industrial policy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Serbia is experiencing a process of de-industrialisation. During the period 2001-
2012 its industrial production has been growing at an average annual rate of 0.2%, 
but it still has not reached the output of the late 1989 (Radovanovic, Kocovic 
2013). In the past three decades, the share of industry in GDP has been decreased, 
as well as the employment in this sector. Serbian exports are dominated mostly by 
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primary and labour- and resource-intensive products making unfavourable export 
structure. The economic transition after 2000 was based on a neoliberal model of 
privatisation and liberalisation. Although there have been certain incentives on the 
part of Government, an industrial policy has not been explicitly defined until 2011, 
when Government of Serbia adopted a Strategy and Policy of Industrial 
Development of Serbia 2011-2020. However, industrial policy is defined within 
this document as implementation of measures and policies in order to facilitate and 
encourage emergence of new enterprises in general (Ibid). It stresses that 
liberalisation and privatisation are the main concepts of industrial policy. The 
question that rises is whether industrial policy defined as such is in line with the 
main tenets of the concept of industrial policy as defined in the contemporary 
literature. In order to address these issues we first have to understand the main 
tenets of industrial policy.  
 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the main tenets of industrial policy. We will first 
provide definitions of industrial policy, then discuss the arguments in favour of the 
implementation of industrial policy, then outline the main challenges and critiques 
of the industrial policy, and finally present the main principles on how an industrial 
policy should be created and implemented.4  
2. WHAT IS AN INDUSTRIAL POLICY? 
“Market forces and private entrepreneurship would be in the 
driving seat of this agenda, but governments would also perform a 
strategic and coordinating role in the productive sphere beyond 
simply ensuring property rights, contract enforcement, and 
macroeconomic stability.” 
Dani Rodrik (Rodrik 2004) 
 
Industrial policy, defined in a broad sense, encompasses all public policies that 
have an impact on industrial development, namely: “policies affecting ‘infant 
industry’ support of various kinds, but also trade policies, science and technology 
policies, public procurement, policies affecting foreign direct investments, 
intellectual property rights and the allocation of financial sources” (Cimoli, Dosi, 
Stiglitz 2009: 1). It includes all the “restructuring policies in favour of more 
dynamic activities generally, regardless of whether those are located within 
industry or manufacturing per se” (Rodrik 2004: 2). Industrial policies are seen as a 
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complement to the market forces, since they “reinforce or counteract the allocative 
effects that the existing markets would otherwise produce” (Ibid: 3). 
 
When defined in a more narrow sense, industrial policy is seen as “a concerted, 
focused, conscious effort on the part of government to encourage and promote a 
specific industry or sector with an array of policy tools” (DCED 2013), or “a policy 
aimed at particular industries (and a firms as their components) to achieve the 
outcomes that are perceived by the state to be efficient for the economy as a 
whole” (Chang 2003a: 112).   
3. WHY DOES A COUNTRY NEED AN INDUSTRIAL POLICY? 
The question that arises is why there is a need for that effort on the part of 
government to encourage and promote a specific industry or sector or even firms. 
The shortest answer is that industrial policy is needed in order to foster economic 
development, seen as “great transformation from traditional economies to 
economies driven by industrial activities (and nowadays also advanced services)” 
(Cimoli, Dosi, Stiglitz 2009). More precisely, a country needs industrial policy 
because: (1)  only certain activities, namely those with increasing returns, 
technological change and synergies, enable economic development, while the 
others, characterised by diminishing returns, unskilled labour, extreme price 
fluctuations, etc., keep a country underdeveloped (Reinert 2007);  (2) countries 
diversify over most of their development path  (Imbs and Wacziarg 2003); (3) in 
the presence of more developed countries, less developed countries cannot develop 
industries without a state intervention (Reinert 2007, Chang 2003b); (4) 
entrepreneurial - risk taking, visionary state invests in areas, crucial for economic 
development, where the private sector does not invest (Mazzucato 2013); (5) 
market fails  to solve a coordination and information problem (Chang 2003a, 
Rodrik 2004);  We will briefly discuss all five arguments.  
 
To begin with, the necessity of industrial policy is based on the assumption that a 
country’s productivity growth is dependent on the economic activities in which it 
specialises (Reinert 2007). In addressing the questions how rich countries became 
rich and why the poor stayed poor, Reinert argues that economic development is 
activity-specific and that it takes place in activities with increasing returns, 
technological change and synergies.5 He distinguishes between two types of 
economic activities. On the one hand, Shumpeterian activities, which operate in 
manufacturing, by means of continual innovation lead to increasing wages, create 
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welfare and development. On the other hand, Malthusian activities characterised by 
diminishing returns, unskilled labour, extreme price fluctuations, etc., found in 
agriculture and raw material extraction, keep wage-levels close to the subsistence 
level (Ibid). In other words, it does matter whether a country specializes in labour- 
and/or resource-intensive types of activities or more technologically advanced, 
capital-intensive manufacturing. In other words, what a country produces 
influences how wealthy it is. However, only through the conscious effort on the 
part of government to encourage and promote a specific industry can a country turn 
form labour- and/or resource-intensive types of activities to more technologically 
advanced, capital-intensive activities. 
 
Moreover, instead of specialising on what a developing country does the best, 
economic development is based on diversification for which an industrial policy is 
needed (Imbs and Wacziargs 2003). Imbs and Wacziargs’ findings, based on the 
examination of the patterns of sectoral concentration and diversification using a 
wide panel of countries, show that as countries get richer sectoral production and 
employment become less concentrated and more diversified. They show that the 
economic activity is spread more equally across sectors until relatively late in the 
development process, when countries start specializing again. In other words, poor 
countries tend to diversify, and only when they reach relatively high levels of per 
capita income they start to specialise (Ibid). However, only through a government 
action and public-private cooperation could productive diversification happen 
(Rodrik 2004). 
 
Furthermore, in order to develop new industries in the presence of more developed 
countries a less developed country needs a state intervention through an industrial 
policy (Chang 2003, Reinert 2007). This is known as “infant industry argument”. 
Infant industry argument was first set out by Alexander Hamilton, the first 
Secretary of the Treasury of the USA, in his Reports of the Secretary of the 
Treasury on the Subject of Manufactures in 1791 (Chang 2003a, Reinert 2007), and 
further developed by Friedrich List in his book The National System of Political 
Economy published in 1841 (Ibid). Hamilton argued that due to the competition 
from abroad new industries that could become internationally competitive would 
not appear in the USA unless their initial losses were covered by the government 
(Ibid). These infant industries needed protection from the competition of more 
advanced foreign (in this case British) competitors until they grow enough to be 
able to compete on international markets. Hamilton advocated for the state aid in 
form of duties or in the rare cases prohibition of import (Chang 2003a). Thus, the 
industrial development of todays’ most developed country was based on 
interventionist policies and only when it obtained industrial supremacy, USA 
finally liberalised its trade (Ibid). However, USA was not the first to use infant 
industry protection. According to List, that was Britain (Chang 2003a). List argues 
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that free trade is beneficial for the countries at the same level of development, 
while infant industries need to be protected until they are able to compete on 
international markets. The policy of infant industry protection, “by a system of 
restrictions, privileges, and encouragements” were used by the Britain and the 
USA, but also Germany, France, Sweden, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, and 
they lie behind the success of Japan and Asian newly industrialised countries 
(Chang 2003a).  
 
Not only do less developed countries need an industrial policy in order to climb up 
the ladder of economic prosperity, but an “entrepreneurial state” is the main 
driving force of the most developed countries. Mazzucato argues that “the radical, 
revolutionary innovations that have fuelled the dynamics of capitalism - from 
railroads to the Internet, to modern-day nanotechnology and pharmaceuticals – 
trace the most courageous, early and capital-intensive ‘entrepreneurial’ investments 
back to the State” (Mazzucato 2013: 3). She argues that “the visible hand of the 
State” made possible for investments that have embedded radical uncertainty to 
happen (Ibid). She points out that “all of the technologies that make Job’s iPhone 
so ‘smart’ were government funded (Internet, GPS, touchscreen display and the 
recent SIRI voice activated personal assistant)” (Ibid). Thus, contrary to the 
wisdom of the mainstream economics, which perceives private sector as dynamic 
and risk-taking, in fact, as Mazzucato argues, the most risky and uncertain 
activities in the economy are undertaken by the State, which takes shapes and 
creates new markets.  
 
Moreover, as Weiss argues, whilst it was not titled as industrial policy, the majority 
of governments continued to intervene in markets, affecting the economy in a 
highly selective manner (Weiss 2013). These interventions have been described as 
‘competitiveness policy’, and many countries have published programmes to raise 
competitiveness, usually focusing on incentives for R&D and innovation.  
 
The question that rises is why the productive forces cannot be developed through 
the market mechanism. It is due to the information and coordination externalities. 
The entrepreneurs of a developing country must experiment with new product 
lines, adapting the technologies from abroad to the local conditions. This requires 
discovery about the costs of such activities. This is what Rodrik and Hausmann call 
“self-discovery” (Hausmann and Rodrik 2004). Such activities have great social 
value, but also high private costs. If the entrepreneur fails, he bears the full cost of 
his failure, while if he succeeds, the value of his discovery is shared with the other 
producers who emulate him. This is known as informational externalities. Since 
easy of entry facilitates imitation, it undercuts the rents to entrepreneurship in self-
discovery. Therefore, entrepreneurs from the low income countries are reluctant to 
engage in self-discovery. Through subsidy of some kind, trade protection, or the 
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provision of venture capital an industrial policy can tackle the informational 
externalities that restrict self-discovery (Rodrik 2004).   
 
Moreover, in the modern industrial economies, characterised by scale economies, 
only few firms can operate, which results in an oligopolistic competition. In such 
case economic actors are strategically interdependent, which leads to inefficiency 
and a state intervention is necessary. Chang argues that intervention needed here is 
not necessary an antitrust-type policy (Chang 2003a). Since in modern industrial 
economies, assets are specific and they lose value when redeployed, coordination 
problem leads towards net reduction in the amount of resources available to the 
economy (Ibid). In order to solve a coordination problem, the following policies 
could be used: investment coordination, recession cartel, negotiated exit or capacity 
scrapping (Chang 2003a). 
4. CHALLENGES OF AN INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
After we have presented arguments in favour of industrial policy, we will now turn 
to its criticism. To begin with, critics of implementation of industrial policy stress 
the problem of information. They argue that it is impossible for governments to 
identify with any degree of precision and certainty the relevant firms, sectors, or 
markets that should be supported (Rodrik 2007). Since the government cannot have 
all the necessary information, it can “miss its targets, support economic activities 
with no positive spillovers, and waste the economy’s resources”, which is usually 
phrased as “governments cannot pick winners” (Ibid).  
 
Moreover, it is argued that industrial policy opens doors for corruption and rent 
seeking (Ibid). If governments provide support to the firms, the firms may demand 
extra benefits and then distort competition, and they would also engage much more 
in asking support than they would look for the ways to expand markets and reduce 
costs (Ibid). 
 
However, as Rodrik points out, “none of this makes this area of policy different 
from conventional areas of government responsibility such as education, health, 
social insurance and safety nets, infrastructure, or stabilization“ (Rodrik 2007: 36). 
In other words, the question is not whether a country needs an industrial policy, it 
is much more about how an industrial policy should be created and implemented.  
5. HOW THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED?  
Rodrik argues that the right model for industrial policy is not that of an 
autonomous government, but of strategic collaboration between the private sector 
and the government with the aim of uncovering where the most significant 
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obstacles to restructuring lie and what type of interventions are most likely to 
remove them (Rodrik 2004). He further argues that “the right way of thinking of 
industrial policy is as a discovery process, when firms and the government learn 
about underlying costs and opportunities and engage in strategic coordination” 
(Ibid: 3). Therefore, the analysis of industrial policy needs focus on getting the 
policy process right. 
 
Stressing that each country is a specific case, Rodrik outlines three general 
principles about how institutions carrying out industrial policy should be designed 
(Rodrik 2007). To begin with, an industrial policy should be “embedded” within 
society. According to Rodrik, industrial policy should not be seen as a list of policy 
instruments, but rather as a process of discovery. A close collaboration between the 
government and the private sector is thus needed. Rodrik argues that the right 
model for industrial policy lies in between the two extremes of strict autonomy of 
the state, on the one hand, and private capture, on the other. “It is a model of 
strategic collaboration and coordination between the private sector and the 
government with the aim of uncovering where the most significant bottlenecks are, 
designing the most effective interventions, periodically evaluating the outcomes, 
and learning from the mistakes being made in the process” (Ibid: 39). He also 
outlines major institutions in support for industrial policy formulation and 
implementation, such as deliberation councils, supplier development forums, 
“search networks,” investment advisory councils, sectoral round-tables, and 
private-public venture funds. He also stresses that contests in which private sector 
firms bid for public resources are useful for eliciting private-sector needs and 
priorities (Ibid).  
 
Secondly, using “carrots and sticks” in order to incentive and discipline economic 
actors is crucial. As it has been already mentioned, an infant industry should be 
protected for certain period, even though it makes losses. Moreover, innovation 
requires rents for entrepreneurs, without which there would be too little investment 
in the activities that promote structural change. In other words, incentives 
(“carrots”) need to be designed for economic actors in order to engage in 
Shumpeterian activities. However, at the same time firms must be disciplined and it 
must be ensured that they do not stay unproductive monopolies. In other words, as 
Rodrik argues “the conduct of industrial policy has to rely on both prongs: it needs 
to encourage investments in non-traditional areas (the carrot), but also weed out 
projects and investments that fail (the stick)” (Ibid: 41). Rodrik lists the following 
mechanisms used in order to bring discipline: conditionality, sunset clauses, built-
in program reviews, monitoring, benchmarking, and periodic evaluation are 
desirable features of all incentive programs, requiring that an incentive expire 
unless a certain goal is reached. It is important that the evaluation criteria are clear 
and set in advance (Ibid).  
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Thirdly, accountability on the part of the state is essential. While business is 
monitored by bureaucrats, the bureaucrats need to be accountable for their policies 
and monitored by the general public.  Rodrik argues that there need to be identified 
a person “who has the job of explaining why the agenda looks as it does, and who 
can be held politically responsible for things going right or wrong” (Ibid: 40). 
Moreover, accountability can be fostered at the level of individual agencies by 
giving them clear mandates and then asking them to report achievements and 
deviations. Finally, a fundamental tool for accountability is transparency. Thus 
councils should make publications of the activities. Also, periodic accounting of 
the expenditures made under industrial policies is needed. In addition, any request 
made by firms for government assistance should be public information and 
government-business dialogs should remain open to new entrants. 
 
Rodrik outlines ten designing principles of an industrial policy:  
1. „Incentives should be provided only to ‘new’ activities. 
2. There should be clear benchmarks/criteria for success and failure. 
3. There must be a built-in sunset clause. 
4. Public support must target activities, not sectors. 
5. Activities that are subsidized must have the clear potential of providing 
spillovers and demonstration effects.  
6. The authority for carrying out industrial policies must be vested in 
agencies with demonstrated competence. 
7. The implementing agencies must be monitored closely by a principal with 
a clear stake in the outcomes and who has political authority at the highest 
level. 
8. The agencies carrying out promotion must maintain channels of 
communication with the private sector. 
9. Optimally, mistakes that result in ‘picking the losers’ will occur. 
10. Promotion activities need to have the capacity to renew themselves, so that 
the cycle of discovery becomes an “ongoing one“ ( Rodrik 2004). 
 
Incentives should focus on economic activities that are new, in terms of products 
and technologies, to the domestic economy. Thus tax incentives should not be 
provided for new investments per se without discriminating between investments 
that expand the range of capabilities of the economy and those that do not.  
 
Although an industrial policy is an experimental process and not all promotion 
efforts will be successful, certain criteria of the success and failure are needed. It is 
proposed that the criteria for success should depend on productivity rather than 
employment or output. This could be done through the project audits by business 
and technical consultants, as well as benchmarking (e.g. the experience of similar 
industries in neighbouring countries) and performance in international markets 
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(e.g. export levels). Moreover, an automatic sunset clause for cancelling support 
after an appropriate amount of time has passed has to be built-in. 
 
Although traditionally industrial policy has been focused on sectors, Rodrik argues 
that the targets of public support should be activities rather than sectors.  Cross-
cutting programs can serve several sectors at once and they are targeted at market 
failures directly. It is important that those activities that are supported have a 
spillover effect to subsequent entrants and rivals.  
 
Moreover, it is crucial that the authority for carrying out industrial policies is in 
agencies with competence. The bureaucratic competence is different in different 
agencies within the same country. It is preferable that the activities of the industrial 
policy are facilitated through such agencies instead of creating new agencies from 
scratch. Moreover, the implementing agencies must be monitored closely by a 
principal with a clear stake in the outcomes and who has political authority at the 
highest level. The principal could be a cabinet-level minister, a vice-president, or 
even the president (or prime minister) himself. 
 
Since the industrial policy is seen as a process of cooperation between the 
government and the private sector, the agencies implementing it must maintain 
channels of communication with the private sector. A good communication allows 
public officials to have an information base on business, without which effective 
promotional activities are not possible. Despite all the precaution measures, the 
mistakes that result in ‘picking the losers’ will occur. However, the costs of the 
mistakes when they do occur should be minimised. 
 
Finally, the promotion activities need to have the capacity to renew themselves. 
The cycle of discovery needs to become an ongoing process. As the time passes, 
some of the key tasks of industrial policy will have to be neglected, while some 
new taken on. Therefore, the agencies that carry out these policies have to have the 
capacity to reinvent and renew themselves.  
At the end, we will list some of the programmes of the industrial policy. Although 
we have stressed out several times that each country is a specific case and that the 
programmes of an industrial policy need to be tailor made, some of the 
programmes have been historically shown as effective.  
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Table 1: Industrial policy programs 
Programmes Description 
Subsidizing costs of “self-
discovery” 
The criteria for subsidising activities:  
1) substantially new activities;  
2)potential to provide learning spillovers to others;  
3)oversight and performance audits. 
Developing mechanisms 
for higher risk finance 
1) development banks; 
2) publicly funded venture funds; 
3) public guarantees for longer term commercial 
bank lending; 
4) special vehicles that direct a share of public 
pension fund assets to a portfolio of higher risk 
investments. 
Internalizing coordination 
externalities 
1) coordination and deliberation councils 
2) chambers of commerce and industry and farmer 
and labour associations 
Public R&D 1) publicly funded R&D efforts to identify, adapt, 
and transfer technology from abroad. 
2) Programs responsive to private sector demands. 
Subsidizing general 
technical training 
subsidizing training for  
1) vocational; 
2)technical; 
3) language skills. 
Taking advantage of 
nationals abroad 
Migrant workers in the advanced countries may be 
valuable as a source of self-discovery at home. 
Governments can actively encourage their return 
and use to them spawn new domestic economic 
activities. 
Source: Rodrik, Dani (2004) “Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century”, Faculty 
Research Working Papers Series, University of Harvard. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Industrial policy is seen as a conscious effort on the part of government to 
encourage and promote activities specific, industry or sector with an array of 
policies, through the process of cooperation and coordination with the private 
sector. In this paper, we have argued that industrial policy is an indispensable tool 
for steering economic development. It is needed both for developing and developed 
countries. Due to the information and coordination externalities, the productive 
forces cannot be developed through the market mechanism itself and the 
intervention on the part of government is needed.   
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Each country is a specific case and the programmes of an industrial policy need to 
be tailor made. The right model for industrial policy is not that of an autonomous 
government, but of strategic collaboration between the private sector and the 
government with the aim of uncovering where the most significant obstacles to 
restructuring lie and what type of interventions are most likely to remove them.  An 
industrial policy should be “embedded” within society. The “carrots and sticks” 
need to be used in order to incentive and discipline economic actors. Finally, the 
accountability on the part of the state is essential. 
 
Some of the programmes of the industrial policy that have been historically shown 
as effective are: Subsidizing costs of “self-discovery”, Developing mechanisms for 
higher risk finance, Internalizing coordination externalities, Public R&D, 
Subsidizing general technical training, Taking advantage of nationals abroad.  
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